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CHILDREN UNDER THE RADAR: THE UNIQUE PLIGHT OF SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILES

My Xuan T. Mai

INTRODUCTION

At first look, Julio Argueta was just another kid from El Salvador. However, his childhood is fraught with a painful past. Julio’s immigration file reveals that his father was shot to death by a wealthy landowner when Julio was one year old. Julio has no memories of his father. Subsequently, his mother passed away. Julio was only eight years old at the time. He only remembers his mother teaching him to cook eggs and tortillas, fetch firewood, and chase chickens out of the house. Following his mother’s death, Julio’s grandfather passed away. Julio then lived with his Aunt Rufina. Aunt Rufina was like a second mother to Julio, but she too died. Distant relatives took in Julio’s younger sister, but left Julio, then fifteen, to fend for himself. On Julio’s sixteenth birthday, he decided to walk north with a bag of clothes. The Border Patrol caught him swimming across the Rio Grande and sent him to a detention facility in Texas. After two months, Julio was sent to his cousin Vilma’s home (also his godmother) in Arlington, Virginia. Vilma too had fled El Salvador when a savage civil war tore the country apart in the 1980’s. Vilma found Julio an immigration attorney, Karla Harr, in a phone book. Harr recommended Julio apply for the Special Immigrant Juvenile visa.

1. J.D. Candidate 2009, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; B.A. 2005, University of Maryland, College Park.
3. Id. at 2-3.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Schulte, supra note 2, at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. At the funeral, Julio’s cousin, Vilma (Rufina’s daughter), came and considered adopting Julio. However, under the current law, adoption paperwork must be completed prior to the minor’s sixteenth birthday. Julio was fifteen already. At the time of Aunt Rufina’s funeral, Julio was three months shy of his sixteenth birthday. Paying someone to smuggle Julio was also out of the question. Vilma subsequently flew back to the States.
12. Id. at 2-3.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Schulte, supra note 2, at 3.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 4. More on special immigrant juveniles, see infra, Parts I and II.
When they first appeared in family court, the judge was not very sympathetic. When returning the second time, the judge agreed to declare Julio eligible for long-term foster care. Armed with the juvenile court’s decision, Julio was able to gain an interview with the Citizenship and Immigration Service to obtain a visa. Two weeks before his eighteenth birthday, Julio had his illegal status adjusted. In 2011, Julio will be eligible for naturalization.

Across the country in Maricopa County, Arizona, Rosa Flor Diaz Godinez will also have a chance at citizenship. Rosa fled her home country of Mexico to escape a rapist. At the tender age of seventeen, Rosa and her cousin crossed the desert into Arizona where they were apprehended by the local sheriff’s office. The fake ID Rosa showed the police indicated her age to be 18; she was thrown into an adult jail. While her cousin couldn’t bear the jail and signed a confession, and was consequently deported, Rosa steadfastly refused. Fortunately, Rosa’s plight was discovered by one Peter Schey and others while on routine visits. Once her age was proven by the Mexican consulate, Rosa was transferred to Southwest Key, a nonprofit organization servicing unaccompanied, undocumented minors. With the help of pro bono attorneys, and numerous attempts later, Rosa was able to obtain a green card before her eighteenth birthday.

Every year, children with stories like Julio and Rosa enter the United States without documentation. The number of illegal immigrants, or put another way, undocumented immigrants, has seen a sharp increase since the 1980s. This sharp
increase has, in turn, resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of undocumented minors in the United States as well.  Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged the overwhelming influx of illegal immigrants in the United States, most notably children. Thousands of undocumented juveniles are arrested each year, and an overwhelming 70% are unaccompanied. With the advent of the Special Immigrant Juvenile statute (hereinafter "SIJ"), however, undocumented juveniles under the age of 21 may have a chance at permanent status. Under the umbrella of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the SIJ provision is a unique blend of state family or juvenile court with federal immigration jurisdiction. SIJ confers a "substantive immigration benefit" upon findings of a state juvenile court. Consequently, state juvenile courts are allowed to determine the best interests and welfare of the child under this statute.

This note argues that the crucial involvement of state courts in determining a child's dependency status should not be upset by the Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter "DHS") ascertaining the child's best interests - something the DHS is not equipped to handle. Part I relates the history of the SIJ statute from its formation in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990. It will also trace how the most recent 1997 amendments have changed the character of the SIJ provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Part II of this article focuses on the implementation of the 1997 amendment to the Special Immigrant Juvenile, specifically the consent requirements of the Attorney General. Additionally, this section will discuss the federal preemption analysis of the dichotomy between federal immigration-

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34. Statistics indicate the number of unauthorized children in the United States to be a staggering 1.3 million, approximately 14% of all unauthorized immigrants. Id. at 18.
36. Id. at 295.
38. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)-(e) (Sept. 6, 2007).
44. Federal regulations define "juvenile court" as "a court located in the United States having jurisdiction under state law to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of juveniles." 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2007).
47. See P.L. 105-119, Title I, § 113, 111 Stat. 2460.
tion and state juvenile courts. Part III will conclude as to why the SIJ statute should be revisited by Congress to provide guidelines for specific consent.

I. HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL IMMIGRANT STATUTE

A. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 §153

Originally passed in 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act was enacted by Congress as a means to deal with the nation’s growing immigrant population and the shifting dynamics of immigration reform. In response to the final report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Congress sought to rectify the nation’s immigration policy with the Immigration Act of 1990 (aka Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990). Similar to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which provides aid to victims of domestic abuse, the SIJ statute was Congress’ answer to a moral crisis involving undocumented children suffering neglect, abuse, or abandonment at the hands of those closest to them – their family. However, unlike VAWA, SIJ does not require that immigration authorities make independent findings of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. A finding by the juvenile court that the child is in need of long-term foster care is sufficient for a determination of SIJ status.

Within the umbrella of the Immigration Act of 1990 was the SIJ provision. From its legislative history, it appears the SIJ provision was passed with little con-

54. While it was the intention of Congress to provide protection to children who had been abused, neglected, or abandoned, the language of the 1990 SIJ provision did not specifically so indicate. See Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548, 552 (6th Cir. 1999) (comparing the pre-1997 amendment SIJ provision with the new law signed on November 26, 1997).

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Perhaps this was the result of growing tension between the state juvenile courts and immigration law officials regarding alien minors being adjudicated as dependent on the state. Due to the expiration of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, many juveniles who would have gained lawful permanent status were now curtailed. Coupled with the highly restrictive nature of the Act—that the juvenile be in the United States since 1982—many juveniles were left unable to adjust their status.

Under the 1990 provision, SIJ status was fairly straightforward. There had to be a dependency order, the immigrant child had to be deemed eligible for long-term foster care and it had to be in the child’s best interests not to be returned to the child’s country of nationality. Thereafter, the juvenile was required to submit a Form I-360 along with an I-485 application for adjustment of status.

B. Before the 1997 Amendment to the Special Immigrant Juvenile Provision

In 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now USCIS and USICE—both under DHS) promulgated regulations to explain how state dependency law and federal immigration law could concurrently apply. As originally enacted in 1990, section 153 did not exempt special immigrant juveniles from statutory requirements for adjustment of status, although they were exempt from deportation. They had to additionally meet the adjustment requirements of section 245. Under section 245(a), the juvenile must demonstrate that they were admitted into the United States only after having been inspected by an immigration official. Further obstacles to overcome under section 245 included prohibiting adjustment for “employ[ment] without authorization, . . . not in lawful nonimmigrant status at the time the application for adjustment is filed, or have failed to continuously maintain lawful nonimmigrant status in the past.” Consequently, a significant number of special immigrant juveniles became ineligible for adjustment of status to permanent residents. Soon after, however, Congress passed the Technical Amend-

63. Id.
64. Id. at 42,847. See also 8 C.F.R § 101.6 redesignated as 8 C.F.R § 204.11 (1993);
65. Porter, supra note 60, at 444.
67. Id. at 42,844.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.

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ments to Section 245 on December 12, 1991, to alleviate the obstacles faced by special immigrant juveniles wishing to adjust their statuses. The Technical Amendments added a new subsection, 245(h), which allows for the adjustment of status regardless of the minor’s original mode of entry into the United States.

C. The 1997 Amendment to the Special Immigrant Juvenile Provision

The SIJ provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 were intended as a protective measure for abused, neglected, or abandoned children who entered the United States illegally. Congress provided an alternative to deportation for these children. Rather than being deported along with their abusive or neglectful parents, or deported to parents who had abandoned them once in the United States, such children were permitted to seek special status to remain in the United States. This rule was abused, however, by juveniles entering the United States as visiting students who would fraudulently petition for SIJ status. While SIJ status had always been intended as a protective measure for abused, neglected, or abandoned children, the language as originally drafted did not limit its application to those cases. Requesting that the Attorney General investigate the fraud, New Mexico Senator Pete Domenici stated that there “is a giant loophole...[E]very visiting student from overseas can have a petition filed in a state court... declaring that they’re a ward and in need of foster care.” The 1997 amendments were enacted to address this problem.

The 1997 amendments made clear that the need for long-term foster care must be due to “abuse, neglect, or abandonment.” It further added the requirement that juveniles in the actual or constructive custody of the INS (now ICE) obtain the Attorney General’s consent in order to give the juvenile court jurisdiction over dependency proceedings. The revisions clarify that state courts may not exert jurisdiction to determine the status of a juvenile in the actual or constructive custo-

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73. Id. at 42,844-45.
74. Id. at 101 P.L. 649; 104 Stat. 4978.
75. Id.
76. Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). See also M.B. v. Quarantillo, 301 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The legislative history demonstrates an intent to remove immigration decisions from the exclusive control of juvenile courts and the social agencies affiliated with them.”)
80. INTERIM FIELD GUIDANCE, 75 Interpreter Releases at 1446 (Oct. 19, 1998).
It is important to note that under both the original and amended statute, parents of children with SIJ status were not allowed to benefit from their child’s status. Logically, the purpose was to curtail families from abusing the SIJ provision for the opportunity of their children to become United States citizens.

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1997 AMENDMENT

A. Criteria for Establishing Special Immigrant Juvenile Status

Most children who benefit from the law are undocumented minors already present in the United States. Consequently, to be eligible, a child must first be present in the United States. This includes children who were detained by, and in the custody of, immigration authorities upon arrival into the United States. For these children, however, there are disheartening hurdles to overcome, because DHS requires the consent of the Attorney General before a state court may exert jurisdiction over the child. Physical presence aside, the child must be “declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State and who has been deemed eligible for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”

The term “‘eligible for long-term foster care’ means that a determination has been made by the juvenile court that family reunification is no longer a viable option.” In addition to the juvenile court’s finding of long-term foster care eligibility, a juvenile judge must also determine “that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.” Armed with this dependency order, a juvenile make seek SIJ status to become a permanent resident.

83. INTERIM FIELD GUIDANCE, supra note 80.
84. The Constitution provides that the “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 provides that “no state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marquee and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1. Thereby, matters of family law and juvenile justice are specifically reserved to the states.
86. Id.
87. Thronson, supra note 45, at 1005.
88. Id.
89. Id.
92. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2008).
94. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)-(d) (2008).
Interestingly, regulations define a juvenile as "an alien under the age of 18 years." The SIJ provision, therefore, extends eligibility for special immigrants to age 21.

The cooperative requirements of the SIJ statute remove from the United States Customs and Immigration Service ("CIS") the dual responsibility of being the gatekeeper of immigrants, while also being the champion of a child’s best interests in becoming a permanent resident. Because the goals of each role are diametrically opposed, it is difficult to imagine a federal governmental agency having the ability to play both a compassionate advocate and adversary to a child. Compounding the problem were the allegations of fraudulent SIJ petitions, thereby requiring the government to become gatekeeper, champion, and investigator. Quite logically, to avoid such conflicts, it is only the state courts that are equipped to handle cases dealing with the best interests of a child.

Soon after the 1997 amendments took effect, the former INS issued field memoranda to clarify the meaning of the new SIJ provisions. Two years later, it issued a second field memorandum. Despite these attempts at additional guidance, the problem with these two memoranda was that INS was still required to make independent findings of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Consequently, this involved having the juvenile relive their traumatizing events before immigration officers untrained in matters of child victims. INS should not have the power to re-adjudicate a matter a juvenile court has already determined. This creates an additional barrier for these juveniles that Congress wanted to protect with the passage of SIJ. Even INS acknowledged that "it would be both impractical and inappropriate for the Service to routinely readjudicate judicial or social service agency administrative determinations as to the juvenile’s best interest." The third memorandum, issued in 2004, superseded all previous guidance issued and warned "adjudicators…not [to] second-guess the [juvenile] court rulings or question whether the court’s order was properly issued." Consequently,

95. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(a) (2007).
96. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2008).
97. INTERIM FIELD GUIDANCE, supra note 80 (regarding Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Asst. Comm’r, Adjudications Div., Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, INS, Regarding Special Immigrant Juveniles – Interim Field Guidance Relating to Public Law 105-119 (Sec. 113) amending Section 101(a)(27)(J) of the INA, (August 7, 1998)).
99. INTERIM FIELD GUIDANCE, supra note 80, at 1446; Cook, supra note 98, at 3; See also Lloyd, supra note 42, at 246.
100. Lloyd, supra note 42, at 246.
103. Id. at 4-5.

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the state court’s dependency order is the substantive evidence required for SIJ status.

While the SIJ statute brings together the state and the federal governments in order to achieve its intent, the dichotomy between state expertise in family law matters and federal immigration enforcement remains quite discernible. It is difficult to imagine a federal governmental agency having the ability to play both a compassionate advocate and fierce adversary to a child. Quite logically it is only the state courts that are equipped to handle cases dealing with the best interests of a child.

B. Consent and the Problem with Federal Immigration Preemption

As a precondition to a finding of SIJ status, the 1997 amendments added the requirement that the attorney general (now the CIS district director) must consent to jurisdiction. This jurisdictional consent is required in two instances. First, where the juvenile has been declared eligible for long-term foster care and it has been determined not to be in the juvenile’s best interests to be returned to his parents’ native country, the Attorney General must expressly consent to the dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant of SIJ status. "Express consent" means that the Secretary, through the CIS district director, has "determined that neither the dependency order nor the administrative or judicial determination of the alien’s best interest was sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse, neglect or abandonment." Put simply, express consent is an acknowledgment by CIS that the SIJ petition is bona fide. The district director is limited to "determining special immigrant status only, not for making determinations of dependency status."

Second, where the juvenile is already in the actual or constructive custody of the DHS, the district director must specifically consent to the juvenile court exercising jurisdiction over the minor child in any dependency proceedings. Such “specific consent refers to a determination to permit a juvenile court, which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the juvenile alien, to exercise jurisdiction for purposes of a dependency determination.” While the Yates Memorandum ad-

105. Id.
106. In addition, following the passage of the Homeland Security Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was disbanded and separated into two entities -- the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) -- both of which are under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security. Lloyd, supra note 42, at n.10. Note that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) still refers to the “Attorney General.” § 1101.
107. Yates, supra note 102, at 4-5.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id. at 2.
112. Id.
dressed the criteria for express consent in detail, it failed to address the eligibility criteria for specific consent.\(^{113}\) This is particularly troubling, because a juvenile dependency order obtained without the consent of the district director would be considered invalid when applying for SIJ status under current regulations.\(^ {114}\) Because the criteria are undefined, many alien children face the prospect of being aged out\(^{115}\) of SIJ status. It is imperative that the DHS promulgate regulations and guidelines to alleviate ambiguities in the current law. While DHS is better suited to deal with immigration law,\(^{116}\) DHS lacks adequate resources to also permit child care services. Another suggestion is for DHS to create a presumption of consent\(^{117}\) to the state juvenile courts in order to streamline the process for these juveniles and not risk them being aged out of eligibility. Alternatively, DHS may allow the juvenile courts to exercise jurisdiction, then require that the state court notify immigration authorities, a possibility that would allow DHS to intervene.\(^ {118}\)

While the SIJ statute makes significant strides in the incorporation of the best interests principle into immigration law for juveniles, the specific consent requirement removes power from the state courts to properly adjudicate abuse, neglect, and abandonment claims of undocumented children. In this regard, the dichotomy between federal immigration and state juvenile courts could not be more apparent. A child’s potential eligibility for SIJ status should not be compromised because the child was unable to avoid immigration custody. True to the intent of SIJ,\(^ {119}\) the proper application should be whether the juvenile is deserving of proper care and attention to protect from abuse, neglect, or abandonment. If juvenile courts were forced to abandon efforts to protect undocumented children from trauma simply due to lack of consent, it would seem a paradoxical contravention of the purpose of SIJ, which is to protect survivors of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.\(^ {120}\)

Underlying these arguments regarding consent is the controversy of federal preemption in immigration matters. Take the case of C.M.K.\(^ {121}\) At the age of sixteen, C.M.K. left his village in China after witnessing the savage beating of his father by relatives of the village head.\(^ {122}\) Desperate, C.M.K. met with smugglers who arranged for his transport into the United States.\(^ {123}\) Upon his arrival, he was transported in a refrigerated truck to a home, where he was beaten several times because he was unable to pay the $26,000 they demanded.\(^ {124}\) He was moved to an apartment in New York City, which was subsequently raided by the now defunct

\(^{113}\) Lloyd, supra note 42, at 247.
\(^{114}\) Yates, supra note 102, at 5.
\(^{115}\) Id. at 6.
\(^{116}\) Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993) (“Over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete.”).
\(^{117}\) Lloyd, supra note 42, at 248.
\(^{118}\) Chen, supra note 43, at 650.
\(^{120}\) Chen, supra note 43, at 643.
\(^{121}\) In re Welfare of C.M.K., 552 N.W.2d 768, 768-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
\(^{122}\) Id. at 769.
\(^{123}\) Id.
\(^{124}\) Id.
C.M.K. was placed into INS custody because he had no parent or relative in the United States. Physical custody of C.M.K. was later transferred to the Lutheran Social Services of Minnesota, which placed him into a foster home. When the foster family petitioned for a dependency order and for findings necessary to obtain SIJ status, it was denied by the juvenile judge due to lack of jurisdiction. C.M.K. was already under deportation proceedings; therefore, federal immigration law preempted state jurisdiction. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that when a "statute has established rules and regulations touching upon the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens," such statute is the "supreme law of the land." In another Minnesota case, Y.W. left China without permission and was smuggled by boat into the United States when he was 15. He is a wanted man in China for having participated in a rally when he was 11. It took two months for Y.W. to arrive to the United States on the boat. When he arrived, Y.W. was hidden away in house basements with other smuggled immigrants. The following year, the home Y.W. stayed in was raided and he was placed into INS custody. Although released into the physical custody of his foster family, deportation proceedings were pending against Y.W. Y.W.'s foster family petitioned to have a juvenile judge issue the requisite orders necessary for a finding of SIJ. On appeal, however, the Minnesota Court of Appeals followed the reasoning in In re Welfare of C.M.K. and held that federal government control over illegal aliens preempted state dependency proceedings.

A few years later in Gao v. Jenifer, the INS arrested sixteen-year-old Gao when he entered the United States unaccompanied and without documentation. After instituting deportation proceedings, the former INS released Gao into foster care with the Lutheran Social Services of Michigan (LSSM). Thereafter, LSSM petitioned the probate court to declare that Gao was dependent, and that it was not in his best interests to be returned to China. While the petition was granted, the INS director denied Gao's petition for SIJ status reasoning that the probate court

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Under Article VI, section 1, clause 2, "law of the United States" means the "supreme Law of the Land." Therefore, federal laws regarding immigration preempt state regulations. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
130. In re Welfare of C.M.K., 552 N.W.2d at 770 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941)).
131. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 3.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 14.
141. Id.
142. Id.
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate Gao’s matter, as Gao was in the “legal custody” of the INS at the time dependency was sought. Contrary to the decisions reached in the Minnesota courts, however, the Sixth Circuit found that the state court’s exercise of jurisdiction “neither interferes with the public administration nor restrains the [federal] government from acting, and sovereign immunity is not offended.”

In both of the Minnesota cases the foster parents brought suit to have their young charge declared dependent on the state, but both were denied. Yet, under the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Gao v. Jenifer, the more appropriate question is “whether a judgment for Gao would ‘interfere with the public administration’ or ‘restrain the government from acting.’” Despite all this, the Sixth Circuit in Gao only limited its ruling to a closed class of juveniles who filed for dependency status prior to the 1997 amendments of SIJ. The Sixth Circuit failed to address the preemption analysis of juveniles who now need specific consent of DHS. In dicta, however, the Gao Court noted that “[s]imilarly situated immigrants whose state dependency cases arose after November 26, 1997 are governed by the amended rule. In those cases, the Attorney General must consent for the juvenile court to have jurisdiction, and must consent for any dependency order to have its pre-amendment effect.” As a result, the Sixth Circuit’s holding provides little, if any, legal clarity for juveniles in DHS custody seeking to petition for SIJ status.

While Congress amended the SIJ status to curb abuse by undeserving immigrants, nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress’ intention was to divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction in an area of law in which it has a vested interest, or to discriminate against minors simply because they are in custody – physical or legal. In the absence of specific congressional ruling, state courts have not surrendered power to federal agencies despite the overlap between the state court’s determination of the juvenile’s best interests and the federal government’s role in immigration. The importance of a rapid response by the state system to a child in need cannot be emphasized enough. Without clear guidelines on specific consent, this provision of the SIJ statute frustrates the state’s interest in protecting these children and possibly risk the children’s safety. When a juvenile is in need of immediate services, it is unduly burdensome and extremely time-consuming to wait for jurisdictional consent from the district director.

143. Id.
144. Id. at 555.
145. Id. at 554.
146. Id. at 556.
147. Id. at 557 (holding that the INS’s interpretation of pre-amendment § 1101(a)(27)(J) depriving state juvenile courts of jurisdiction over juveniles in INS custody is an abuse of discretion).
148. Id. at 553.
149. Lloyd, supra note 42, at 255.
151. Id.

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III. CONCLUSION

No one chooses to whom, where, and how they will be born. Imagine being born into a home unwanted, born into a home where you were repeatedly abused and neglected. Unexpectedly, you lose your family. You then come to a new country to seek a better future, only to find yourself, once again, abused, neglected, and abandoned—this time, not by family, but by the hands of the government that boasts to the world to “[g]ive me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free; send these...to me; I lift my lamp beside the golden door.”

Despite such humanitarian ideals, you find yourself plagued with even more obstacles to overcome in your quest for permanency.

Congress’ noble intentions in enacting the SIJ statute was to protect the weakest segment of society—children. The original SIJ provision was straightforward. There had to be a dependency order, the immigrant child had to be deemed eligible for long-term foster care and it had to be in the child’s best interests not to be returned to the child’s country of nationality. Then came allegations of fraudulent petitions of SIJ, and Congress amended the statute in 1997. The amended statute specifically applies to abused, neglected, or abandoned children only. Therefore, parents, siblings, or family members cannot collaterally benefit from SIJ. It is solely for the child’s benefit.

The 1997 amendment, however, is plagued with the factor of consent and ultimately, preemption. While DHS has promulgated guidelines in determining express consent for a juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction over an immigrant child, it has utterly neglected to clarify the more problematic requirement of specific consent, which arises when the immigrant child is in the legal or constructive custody of DHS. Hence, while it may be conceivably reasonable to require the federal government’s consent before a juvenile court may make dependency findings, the child’s future, however, cannot wait. A child in need of immediate and specialized state care will be jeopardized if he must wait to get permission to receive help.

In the meantime, however, states can also be proactive in assuring that unaccompanied minors are taking advantage of the SIJ statute. Los Angeles County, for example, is seen as a model nationwide in its comprehensive program. Officials at the CIS office in Los Angeles have streamlined the process for special immigrants by recognizing that aging out of eligibility is a concrete problem faced by many undocumented minors. As a result, CIS officials in Los Angeles have started “accepting applications directly and interviews well ahead of an applicant’s

153. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2008).
157. Anna Gorman, Green Cards Go Unclaimed by Many Youths in Foster Care: Certain Abused or Abandoned Dependents of the State are Eligible for Legal Residency, But Not All Know the Law, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 25, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 11915768, 2.
158. Id. at 4.
21st birthday.” Furthermore, through an awareness program, advocates and government officials conduct training sessions to educate social workers, judges, immigration officials, pro bono attorneys, and youths. With respect to youths, agencies in California must also educate undocumented minors in their care how to acquire and complete a SIJ application – Form 1-360: Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er) or Special Immigrant. In addition, advocates also target rural areas where the immigrant population is not as dense, and perhaps where the law has not quite reached those who can most find reprieve by it.

Until Congress takes initiative and amends or repeals the specific consent requirement, the hands of state courts remain bound under federal immigration law. The underlying preemption obstacle between state and federal law will continue to create an invisible barrier for the child. This creates a catalyst for problems, as the state court is not allowed to interfere, even where a child is in dire need of assistance. Unfortunately, for now, state courts are forced to sit idly by, awaiting reform of SIJ and abused, neglected, and abandoned children are longing for a day to become permanent residents and live a life of freedom.

159. Id.
160. Id. at 2.
163. Id.